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Comments
CUSTODY RIGHTS OF GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS
I can bear [all else except that] ... my two children are taken
from me by legal procedure. That is, and always will remain to
me a source of infinite distress, or infinite pain .... The dis-
grace of prison is as nothing compared with it.'
Oscar Wilde, 19th century gay poet and playwright, writing in De
Profundis, while he was imprisoned for sodomy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has validated the commonly held
belief that parents in most intact marriages have a fundamental right to
bear and raise children. 2 When a marriage is irretrievably broken be-
cause of a divorce or legal separation, however, any automatic right to
care for one's children is supplanted by a judicial determination of
which parent should have physical custody of the children.8 Courts
overwhelmingly apply the "best interest of the child" standard when
making this determination.4
In theory, the best interest standard requires courts to examine the
circumstances of each parent in determining which parent can offer the
child the optimal environment.5 Courts applying this standard should
not allow their decisions to be influenced by a desire to punish or re-
ward parents for pre-divorce conduct. Instead, such courts should ex-
amine the situation from the child's point of view and should place the
1. 0. WILDE, DE PROFUNDIS 34 (R. Ross ed. 1909). Other comprehensive
and well-written articles on this subject have also begun with this Wilde quote.
See, e.g., Beargie, Custody Determinations Involving the Homosexual Parent, 22 FAM.
L.Q. 71, 71 (1988); Comment, Immoral Because They're Bad Bad Because They're
Wrong: Sexual Orientation and Presumptions of Parental Unfitness in Custody Disputes, 26
CAL. W.L. REV. 395, 395 (1990).
2. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (right to "bring up chil-
dren" is within scope of fourteenth amendment protection).
3. Comment, Gay Parents: A Legal Oxymoron in Ohio?, 18 CAP. U.L. REv. 277,
278 (1989) (once marriage is dissolved, state has compelling interest in placing
child's best interests above parental rights).
4. See, e.g., Ellerbe v. Hooks, 490 Pa. 363, 366, 416 A.2d 512, 513 (1980)
("[I]n every custody dispute the fundamental issue is the best interest of the
child."); Bull v. Bull, 206 Cal. App. 2d 642, 643, 24 Cal. Rptr. 149, 150 (1962)
(standard is which home will allow the child to be "better cared for, better
trained, more secure and happier").
5. See, e.g., Bull, 206 Cal. App. 2d at 643-46, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 150-51 ("best
interest" standard was applied to ensure parental fitness).
(1665)
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child in the best home.6 In reality, however, judges often inject their
biases and prejudices about societal norms and morality under the guise
of the "best interest" of the child. 7 Consequently, the best interest of
the child standard becomes highly problematic where one of the parents
is homosexual. 8
Due to society's misunderstandings and preconceived notions
about homosexual individuals, gay men and lesbian women 9 have in-
credible burdens to overcome in obtaining or retaining custody of their
natural children. 10 Courts invariably consider a parent's homosexuality
6. See, e.g., UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1987).
Section 402 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act provides:
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best in-
terest of the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors
including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his par-
ent or parents, his siblings, and any other person who may signifi-
cantly affect the child's best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community;
and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that
does not affect his relationship to the child.
Id.
7. Comment, Gay Parenting: Myths and Realities, 9 PACE L. REV. 129, 160-61
(1989) ("best interest" standard may allow judges and attorneys to impose
"their own sentimental values about child rearing").
8. Id. at 161. One commentator has noted:
With regard to homosexuality, many decisions based on the best inter-
est of the child presuppose that a child whose parent is socially deval-
ued is injured by placement with that parent. At the very least, in many
cases judges and attorneys have intimated that a child raised in a homo-
sexual home environment is necessarily worse off than a child raised in
a heterosexual home environment. The more subtle issue in these
cases is to what extent the court has given tacit approval to social and
moral proscriptions against homosexual expression.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
I use the term "homosexual" as an adjective and not as a noun because it is
a characteristic of a person's sexual orientation and not a characterization of
who or what he or she is. The term cannot define a kind of person any more
than the label "a blonde" can define all kinds of people who have blonde hair.
Additionally, for the sake of this discussion, the term "homosexual" shall in-
clude people who classify themselves as "bisexual," in other words, those indi-
viduals who are sexually attracted to both men and women. A bisexual parent is
often involved in divorce-related custody cases after creating the child through
heterosexual relations with his or her spouse.
9. The terms "gay" and "lesbian" will be used as adjectives and not as
nouns.
10. See Comment, supra note 3, at 279-81 (judges may consciously or sub-
consciously allow community standards and personal prejudices against homo-
sexual parenting to influence "best interests" analysis); see also Comment,
Homosexual Parenting: Child Custody and Adoption, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009,
1013-21 (1989). The author expresses his appreciation to the authors of both of
[Vol. 36: p. 16651666
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when determining whether awarding custody would be in the child's
best interest." Moreover, because initial custody determinations are
not permanent, there is no guarantee that a homosexual parent who ob-
tains custody of his or her child will not lose that custody at a later
date. 12 A court may modify or revoke an earlier custody determination
upon a showing of "materially changed circumstances" by either of the
parties involved.' 3 One parent's "coming out of the closet"' 14 may suf-
fice to resurrect the custody issue, as may a parent's entering into a sig-
nificant relationship with a member of the same sex. 15
these cited sources for their well written and thoughtful articles which address
many of the same issues addressed in this Comment.
11. For a discussion ofjurisdictions considering homosexuality as grounds
for denial of custody rights, see infra notes 26-48 and accompanying text. For a
discussion ofjurisdictions considering the parent's sexual orientation as merely
one factor in their analysis, see infra notes 49-120 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of jurisdictions applying the true "best interest of the child" test,
where the parent's homosexuality is only considered when there is a "nexus"
which connects the orientation to an adverse effect on the child, see infra notes
133-65 and accompanying text.
12. For cases illustrating that initial custody determinations are not perma-
nent, see infra note 15. Section 409(a) of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
creates a two year period during which the initial custody decree cannot be mod-
ified, unless there is a showing of serious endangerment to the child's physical,
mental, moral or emotional health. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Aar
§ 409(a), 9A U.L.A. 628 (1987). The goal of placing restrictions on custody
modification challenges is to maximize finality and provide continuity for the
child. See UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 409(a) comment, 9A U.L.A.
628 (1987); see also M.P. v. S.P., 169 N.J. Super. 425, 431-32, 404 A.2d 1256,
1259-60 (App. Div. 1979); Note, Child Custody Modification Under the Uniform Mar-
riage and Divorce Act: A Statute to End the Tug-Of-War?, 67 WASH. U.L.Q. 923
(1989).
13. See Note, Parent's Sexual Lifestyle Not Determinative in Custody Proceeding, 40
S.C.L. REV. 116, 116 (1988) ("Modification is required only if the evidence indi-
cates a change of conditions that substantially affects the welfare of the child.").
14. "Coming out of the closet" is the euphemism for a person identifying
himself or herself as a gay man or lesbian woman. See Harris & Turner, Gay and
Lesbian Parents, 12J. HOMOSEXUALrry 101, 102 (1986).
15. See, e.g., In rejane B., 85 Misc. 2d 515, 527, 380 N.Y.S.2d 848, 860 (Sup.
Ct. 1976). Where the announcement of one parent's homosexuality is made in
conjunction with a decision to live with a member of the same sex, the other
parent often will argue that such a decision represents a sufficient change of
circumstances to warrant a modification of the initial custody order. InJane B., a
father successfully petitioned for change of custody due to the mother's sus-
pected and later confirmed lesbianism. Id. at 527-28, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 860. The
New York court found that the mother's homosexual relationship created an
"improper environment" for her child. Id.; accord M.J.P. v.J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966,
967 (Okla. 1982) (lesbian mother's continuing relationship sufficient change of
circumstance to warrant modification of custody order).
"Coming out," however, is not always interpreted as a significant changed
circumstance which warrants modification. For example, in Stroman v. Wil-
liams, 291 S.C. 376, 353 S.E.2d 704 (Ct. App. 1987), a father failed in his at-
tempt to obtain modification based solely on the lesbian mother's ongoing
relationship. Id. at 378, 353 S.E.2d at 706; accord M.P. v. S.P., 169 NJ. Super.
425, 438-39, 404 A.2d 1256, 1263 (App. Div. 1979) (mother's sexual orientation
COMMENT 16671991]
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Adoption proceedings often involve many of the same issues that
arise in custody proceedings. Adoption is a privilege created by state
statute to allow people who cannot or choose not to bear children to
establish a parental relationship with a child.' 6 Courts have held that
there is no fundamental right to adopt, and therefore, adoption peti-
tions by homosexual individuals may be rejected without infringing on
the equal protection clause.' 7
Courts administering adoption proceedings are charged with the
responsibility of creating a permanent family environment where origi-
nally there was none.18 Many courts are reluctant to create permanent
"non-traditional" families.' 9 Furthermore, most jurisdictions prefer to
place children with married couples rather than to allow single people,
whether heterosexual or homosexual, to adopt.20 This judicial prefer-
ence for married couples prejudices gay and lesbian couples because
homosexual relationships, regardless of their genuineness and stability,
carry no legal significance in most states.21 Additionally, although sin-
improper grounds for custody modification, absent any other showing of
changed circumstances affecting child).
16. See Comment, supra note 10, at 1026. For a discussion of several state
adoption statutes, see infra notes 172-79 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., In re Opinion of theJustices, 129 N.H. 290, 295-96, 530 A.2d
21, 24 (1987). The New Hampshire Supreme Court applied a rational relation-
ship test to the question of whether a fundamental right to adopt existed. Id.
The court held that proposed legislation that would exclude gay or lesbian per-
sons as possible foster and adoptive parents was constitutional. Id. The court
found a legitimate state purpose in eliminating "the 'social and psychological
complexities' which living in a homosexual environment could produce in...
children." Id.
18. See In re Appeal in Pima CountyJuvenile Action B-10489, 151 Ariz. 335,
338-39, 727 P.2d 830, 833-34 (Ct. App. 1986). Unlike custody decisions, adop-
tion orders, when finalized, are not subject to future modification upon a show-
ing of changed circumstances because a legal parent-child relationship is
created. See id. at 339, 727 P.2d at 834 ("(S]ingle-parent adoptions are final with
no subsequent available option of shifting custody between parents. Once an
adoption is final, the sole means of reversal is by termination of parental rights-
a remedy not lightly undertaken.").
19. See, e.g., id. at 338-40, 727 P.2d at 833-35 (possibility that child may be
exposed to father's homosexual relationships at some point in future was suffi-
cient reason to deny certificate of acceptability to gay man who wished to adopt).
For example, Massachusetts has a policy that requires foster care and adoption
agencies to attempt to place children in so-called "traditional settings." See
Comment, supra note 10, at 1027 nn.123-25.
20. See Comment, supra note 10, at 1030. In Massachusetts, for example,
agencies are required to use the following order of priority in placing children:
(1) married couples with experience in childraising, (2) married couples without
experience in childraising, (3) single parents or unmarried couples and (4) gay
and lesbian couples or singles. Id. at 1027 n.123.
21. See Comment, Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HALv. L. Rxv. 1508,
1606 (1989) (states "universally" have denied same-sex couples the right to
marry). Some progress in acknowledging the rights of homosexual couples,
however, has been made through the creation of legally-recognized "domestic
partnership" rights for heterosexual and homosexual cohabitants. See, e.g., D.C.
1668 [Vol. 36: p. 1665
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gle heterosexual persons can adjust their status as potential adoptive
parents by marrying, homosexual persons cannot.22
A gay man or lesbian woman applying to adopt a child may encoun-
ter many of the same obstacles confronting a homosexual parent seek-
ing to assert custody rights. 25 These obstacles include societal and
court biases against homosexual parents. 24 Unfortunately, courts hesi-
tate to place a child in a non-traditional environment, even when the
placement would arguably be in the best interest of the child. 25
II. CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS
A. A Parent's Homosexuality as the Sole Ground for Denial of Custody
Courts making custody determinations2 6 differ with respect to the
standards and tests applicable when one parent is homosexual. Several
courts have held that a parent's homosexuality may be an absolute bar
to his or her custody rights. 27 Other courts apply a conclusive presump-
tion of unfitness, and find that a person's status as a gay man or lesbian
CODE ANN. § 2-3601 (Supp. 1991) (creating Commission on Domestic Partner-
ship Benefits for District of Columbia government employees); see also Two As-
socs. v. Brown, 131 Misc. 2d 986, 989-90, 502 N.Y.S.2d 604, 606-07 (Sup. Ct.
1986), rev'd on other grounds, 127 A.D.2d 173, 513 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1987), appeal
dismissed, appeal denied, 70 N.Y.2d 792, 522 N.Y.S.2d 106, 516 N.E.2d 106 (1987)
(same-sex cohabitant permitted to remain in rent-controlled apartment regis-
tered in name of deceased homosexual partner because his relationship to the
man had been "as close as that of a family member").
22. Comment, supra note 10, at 1030. Presently, no state has a provision
for legally-recognized homosexual marriages. See Comment, supra note 21, at
1606 & nn. 16-18 (even if statutes do not expressly prohibit homosexual mar-
riage, courts will interpret them as if they do). Some clergy members of various
religions, however, have supported "marriage ceremonies" that carry no legal
significance, but illustrate the stability of a couple's homosexual relationship.
See L.A. Times, Dec. 7, 1987, § 1, at 3, col. 1 (rabbi and various Protestant offi-
cials have performed ceremonial blessings for gay and lesbian couples).
23. Comment, supra note 10, at 1029-30.
24. Id. at 1029-32. For a further discussion of the misconceptions that hin-
der homosexual parents seeking custody, see infra notes 53-120 and accompany-
ing text.
25. See Comment, supra note 3, at 277. One commentator has defined a gay
person's right to adopt as "the most tenuous of parental rights today." Id.
26. It is important to distinguish custody arrangements from visitation
rights. This section deals only with custody, because visitation is normally gen-
erously granted, barring any threat of harm to the child. See, e.g., In re Marriage
of Cabalquinto, 100 Wash. 2d 325, 328-29, 669 P.2d 886, 888 (1983), appeal after
remand, 43 Wash. App. 578, 718 P.2d 7 (1986) (homosexual father's right to
visitation should be upheld, absent any showing of harm to physical, mental or
emotional health of child).
27. See, e.,., G.A. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d 726, 727-28 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)
(mother's lesbian relationship, which court believed would provide "unhealthy
environment" for her son, "tipped the scales" in favor of custody award to fa-
ther); Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 344 Pa. Super. 49, 58, 496 A.2d 1, 5 (1985)
("presumption of regularity" favors traditional, in other words, heterosexual re-
lationships). For a discussion of G.A., see infra notes 42-45 and accompanying
5
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woman directly contradicts his or her status as a parent.2 8 Some courts,
rather than applying a conclusive presumption, nevertheless require gay
and lesbian parents to rebut the presumption that homosexuality ren-
ders them unfit to raise their children. 29 For example, in Constant A. v.
Paul C.A., 30 the Pennsylvania Superior Court expressly stated that
"where there is a custody dispute between members of a traditional fam-
ily environment and one of homosexual composition, the presumption of
regularity applies to the traditional relationship."' I
The Constant A. court held that despite the mother's stable eight
year relationship with a woman, her lesbianism prevented her from ob-
taining expanded custody of two of her children.3 2 The lower court had
contended that the mother's lesbian relationship showed her "moral de-
ficiency." 33 The superior court actually commended the trial judge for
his candor, noting: "We would prefer to have [him] express his belief as
to the morality of this issue, than to conceal it and to have it be an un-
verbalized consideration.' 3 4 The superior court also acknowledged that
there exists a "national bias, which cannot be ignored .... to favor the
non-homosexual parent in a custody case." 35 In considering the argu-
ment that homosexuality is against societal values associated with the
propagation of the human race, the court opined that any comparison
between "illicit" homosexual relationships and meretricious heterosex-
ual relationships was unfounded because the latter may still produce off-
spring.3 6 Additionally, the court remarked that "if the traditional family
relationship (lifestyle) was banned, human society would disappear in
little more than one generation, whereas if the homosexual lifestyle
were banned, there would be no perceivable harm to society."37
Jurisdictions that use homosexuality as a bar to awarding custody
text. For a discussion of Constant A., see infra notes 30-37 and accompanying
text.
28. See, e.g., Roe v. Roe, 228 Va. 722, 324 S.E.2d 691 (1985). In Roe, the
court held that "[tihe father's continuous exposure of the child to his immoral
and illicit relationship renders him an unfit and improper custodian as a matter
of law." Id. at 727, 324 S.E.2d at 694. For a more detailed discussion of the
burden this presumption places on the homosexual parent, see Beargie, supra
note 1, at 74-75.
29. See, e.g., Constant A., 344 Pa. Super. at 58, 496 A.2d at 5.
30. 344 Pa. Super. 49, 496 A.2d 1 (1985).
31. Id. at 58, 496 A.2d at 5.
32. Id. at 67-68, 496 A.2d at 10. The mother sought expanded shared cus-
tody rights although she was initially granted only controlled partial custody and
visitation rights. Id. at 52, 496 A.2d at 2. She sought modification to reflect her
"changed circumstance" in that she had resolved her sexual identity problems
and had maintained a stable lesbian relationship for eight years. Id at 53, 496
A.2d at 3.
33. Id. at 54, 496 A.2d at 3.
34. Id. at 57, 496 A.2d at 5 (emphasis omitted).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 60-61, 496 A.2d at 6-7.
37. Id. at 59 n.6, 496 A.2d at 6 n.6.
1670
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 6 [1991], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss6/7
fail to focus on which parent can offer the child the optimal environ-
ment, as the "best interest of the child" standard requires. These courts
judge the homosexual parent by his or her alleged "indiscretion" with-
out actually considering the interests of the child involved.3 8 Empirical
data shows that a person's sexual orientation does not have a per se
detrimental effect on his or her child.3 9 Therefore, such punitive cus-
tody decisions directly contradict the rationale behind the "best interest
of the child" standard. Just as many courts hold that a heterosexual par-
ent's prior sexual history or non-marital relationship cannot by itself bar
his or her custody rights,40 a homosexual parent's orientation should
not by itself destroy his or her right to raise children.
Jurisdictions that view homosexuality as conflicting with notions of
parenting often deny custody to homosexual parents with little or no
evidence of any detrimental effect.4 1 Furthermore, even when evidence
is presented that repudiates the alleged detrimental effect on the child,
many judges still favor the heterosexual parent over the homosexual
38. See, e.g., Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-II, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 123
(Tenn. App. Mar. 30, 1988). One Tennessee Court of Appeals judge stated:
While Mother's homosexuality may be beyond her control, submitting
to it and living with a person of the same sex in a sexual relationship is
not. Just as an alcoholic overcomes the habit and becomes a non-
drinker, so this mother should attempt to dissolve her "alternate life
style" of homosexual living. Such is not too great a sacrifice to...
(expect] of a parent in order to gain or retain custody of his or her
child. This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that throughout
the ages, dedicated, loving parents have countless times made much
greater sacrifices for their children.
a d at *29-30 (Tomlin, P.J., concurring).
39. For a discussion of empirical data revealing that a person's homosexu-
ality does not have a per se detrimental effect on his or her child, see infra notes
54, 72 and 157-61 and accompanying text.
40. See Beargie, supra note 1, at 76. In New York, for example, the sexual
lifestyle of a parent is deemed to be one of the factors to consider in a custody
determination, but a court cannot deny a parent custody of his or her child
solely on that basis. See Feldman v. Feldman, 45 A.D.2d 320, 322, 358 N.Y.S.2d
507, 510 (1974) ("[A]morality, immorality, sexual deviation and what we conve-
niently consider aberrant sexual practices do not ipso facto constitute unfitness
for custody."); CC v. CC, 37 A.D.2d 657, 657, 322 N.Y.S.2d 388, 389-90 (1971)
(heterosexual mother's overnight visitors did not render her unfit for custody,
absent evidence that her conduct was "actually affecting" her son's upbringing).
41. See, e.g., G.A. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d 726, 727-28 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (cus-
tody awarded to single father rather than lesbian mother with no discussion of
parenting skills).
1991] COMMENT 1671
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parent.42 For example, in G.A. v. D.A.,43 the Missouri Court of Appeals
denied a lesbian mother custody, finding that her lesbianism and her
failure to specify a program of religious training for her son indicated
that her home could be an unhealthy and harmful environment for
him. 4 4 The dissenting judge ridiculed the majority's limited approach
for determining which parent could provide a better environment, not-
ing that the facts of the case clearly revealed that the mother was capable
of providing the "superior" physical living arrangement. 4 5
Rulings which are based solely on the parent's homosexuality are
contrary to the requirements of the "best interest of the child" test.4 6
Such punishment-oriented decisions are contrary to the view of other
courts that "custody and visitation privileges are not to be used to pe-
nalize or reward parents for their conduct."'4 7 Courts seeking what is in
the child's best interest should not discriminate on the basis of a par-
ent's sexual orientation unless a direct causal relationship is shown be-
tween that orientation and a possible adverse affect on the child.48
B. A Parent's Homosexuality as One Factor to be Considered
in Custody Determinations
Most courts do not expressly state that a parent's homosexuality is a
bar to his or her custody rights.4 9 Instead, most courts find that the
sexual orientation of a parent is one factor that necessarily must be con-
42. See, e.g., T.C.H. v. K.M.H., 784 S.W.2d 281, 283-85 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)(despite children's desire to live with mother and determination by psycholo-
gists and social workers that she would be the better custodian, court stated that
her lesbianism would adversely affect children's morality); cf. Comment, supra
note 1, at 408 (presumption that homosexual parent is unfit "may frequently
leave the child in the hands of a less-fit parent or third party"). Evidence show-
in& "fitness" is often found only in dissents of these cases, because the judges
writing the majority opinions are predisposed to find against the homosexual
parent. See, e.g., G.A. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d at 728-30 (Lowenstein, J., dissenting)(majority opinion failed to mention facts which could dispel presumption of un-
fitness, if it were rebuttable, and instead relied on fact of lesbianism as proof
positive of unfitness).
43. 745 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
44. Id. at 727-28.
45. Id. at 728-29 (Lowenstein, J., dissenting) ("To tip the scales solely on
the basis of what "may" befall the child because of the mother's sexual prefer-
ence results in this high stakes decision on the child's welfare being made on less
than complete information and renders it suspect.").
46. See Comment, supra note 1, at 409.
47. See In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 100 Wash. 2d 325, 669 P.2d 886(1983), appeal after remand, 43 Wash. App. 578, 718 P.2d 7 (1986). The Washing-
ton Supreme Court stated that the lower court's restriction of visitation rights, if
based solely on father's homosexuality, violated Washington state law that "ho-
mosexuality in and of itself is not a bar to custody or to reasonable rights of
visitation." Id. at 329, 669 P.2d at 888.
48. For a discussion of the causal relationship, or "nexus" approach, see
infra notes 133-165 and accompanying text.
49. See Comment, supra note 7, at 150.
1672 [Vol. 36: p. 1665
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sidered for a complete "best interest of the child" analysis.50 A genuine
adherence to the "best interest of the child" standard, however, exam-
ines the parent's sexual orientation only to discover whether it has some
direct and adverse effect on the child. 5 1 Unfortunately, some courts re-
ject this approach, and prefer to presume that a parent's homosexuality
must adversely affect the child.52 Therefore, many courts still strongly
weigh the sexual orientation of a parent when making custody decisions.
1. Alleged Effect a Parent's Homosexuality on a Child's Morality
Because a parent plays an important role in teaching a child right
from wrong, courts often consider the effect a parent's own lifestyle has
on his or her child when making custody determinations. This analysis
conforms with the "best interest" standard. A problem arises, however,
when a court determines that the fact that a parent is a gay man or a
lesbian woman is, in and of itself, evidence of his or her immorality. 53
The court's purported concern is that the alleged immorality will "rub
off" on the children, and that they will become immoral, or even homo-
sexual, themselves.5 4
50. See Comment, supra note 7, at 151. In some cases, however, courts
merely give lip service to the notion that homosexuality does not per se bar
custody and list other reasons for denying custody to the homosexual parent
simply to justify their preconceived view that a homosexual parent should not
have custody. See id. at 150-52.
51. See id. at 153. For an analysis of the "nexus" test as the most appropri-
ate means of evaluating custody disputes under the "best interest of the child"
standard, see infra notes 133-165 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g.,J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786, 792 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (explic-
itly rejecting the "nexus" approach); S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166
(Mo. Ct. App. 1987) ("(Homosexual] conduct can never be kept private enough
to be a neutral factor in the development of a child's values and character.").
53. See, e.g., T.C.H. v. K.M.H., 784 S.W.2d 281, 284-85 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)
(mother's lesbian relationship and "series of lies" she told in denying it viewed
as "proof" of immorality); G.A. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d 726, 727-28 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987) (mother's lesbianism, combined with failure to specify whether she would
provide religious training for her son, rendered her unfit to have custody).
54. See, e.g., In rejane B., 85 Misc. 2d 515, 521, 380 N.Y.S.2d 848, 854 (Sup.
Ct. 1976) (psychiatrist testified that child might "emulate" mother's lesbian
lifestyle). Many psychological and sociological studies suggest that a child will
not become homosexual merely by living with a homosexual parent. In fact,
some published reports conclude that a child establishes his or her own sexual
orientation by age three. See In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action B-
10489, 151 Ariz. 335, 342, 727 P.2d 830, 837 (Ct. App. 1986) (Howard, J., dis-
senting) (testimony verified young age of sexual orientation). Information re-
garding the possible affects of a parent's homosexuality has been used in
custody cases. See Green, Sexual Identity of 37 Children Raised by Homosexual or
Transsexual Parents, 135 AM.J. PSYCHiATRY, 692, 696 (1978) (parental lifestyle is
not sole contributing factor influencing child's style of psychosexual develop-
ment); Kleber, Howell & Tibbits-Kleber, The Impact of Parental Homosexuality in
Child Custody Cases: A Review of the Literature, 14 BULL. Am. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L.
81, 83 (1986) (children of lesbian mothers have not demonstrated aberrant gen-
der identity development, increased preference for homosexual object choice or
1991] COMMENT 1673
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InJ.P. v. P. W. ,5 the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the restric-
tion of a gay father's custody rights, even though the lower court had
justified the restriction on the alleged immorality associated with the fa-
ther's sexual orientation.56 Initially, the father had been granted "pos-
sessory custody" of his daughter for ten days every other month.5 7 The
child's mother, however, successfully petitioned to have the custody or-
der modified to require adult supervision of the father's visits and to
exclude the father's gay partner from those visits.5 8 Stressing the role
that a homosexual lifestyle may play in a child's moral development, the
trial court stated:
It is not our function to indite a revisionary preachment as
to moral models. We do recognize that today we have chang-
ing standards of morality. Certain conduct once looked upon
by society with opprobrium does not carry the social or private
stigma it once did a few short years ago. Such conduct may
even be socially "approved." But private personal conduct by a
parent which could well have an effect on children during the
years in which their character, morality, virtues, and values are
being formed, cannot be ignored or sanctioned by courts. Pri-
vate conduct of a parent in the presence of a child or even
under some other circumstances may well influence his or her
young, impressionable life.... No matter how [this parent] or
society views the private morality of the situation, we cannot
ignore the influence [the parent's] conduct may well have upon
the future of this child and cannot give our judicial cachet to
such conduct by etching in the law-books for all to read and
follow. We see no salutary effect for the young child in expos-
ing him [or her] to the [parent's] miasmatic moral standards.5 9
Although direct testimony from the child's guardian ad litem60 por-
enhanced social/emotional maladjustment, when compared with children raised
by single heterosexual mothers).
A recent study by Simon LeVay, a biologist at the Salk Institute for Biologi-
cal Studies in San Diego, California revealed that there may be a physiological
basis for the sexual orientation of gay men. LeVay's research suggested that the
interstitial nuclei of the anterior hypothalamus, the portion of the brain which
regulates male sexual behavior, was found to be smaller in the brains of homo-
sexual cadavers than in heterosexual ones. While the test was limited to the 41
patients tested, the study strongly indicates that sexual orientation is biologically
predestined within a person. For a full discussion of LaVay's study, see Gorman,
Are Gay Men Born That Way?, TIME Sept. 9, 1991, at 60.
55. 772 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
56. Id. at 794.
57. Id. at 786.
58. Id. at 786-87, 794.
59. Id. at 789 (quoting L.H.Y. v.J.M.Y., 535 S.W.2d 304, 308 (Mo. Ct. App.
1976)).
60. The court appointed a guardian ad litem, who was a social worker and
1674 [Vol. 36: p. 1665
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trayed the gay father as a "conscientious, responsible, loving and caring
person," 6 1 theJ.P. court found that his homosexuality could have an
adverse effect on the child's moral development, and therefore, it con-
cluded that it would be in the child's best interest to restrict the father's
custody rights. 6 2
Collins v. Collins63 provides another example of a court finding that a
parent's homosexuality may detrimentally affect his or her child's moral
development. In Collins, the fact that the mother had taken four differ-
ent lesbian partners over a ten year period greatly contributed to the
court's finding that she was less fit as a parent than the father, who was
involved in a nine year heterosexual relationship.6 One judge, concur-
ring in the majority opinion, believed that the mother established an
immoral example which would adversely affect her daughter and there-
fore, found the mother to be an unfit parent. 65 Thejudge reasoned that
because "homosexuality has been considered contrary to the morality of
man for well over two thousand years," children must be protected from
certified counselor, because the child was only two years old at the time of these
proceedings. Id. at 791.
61. Id.
62. Id at 792-94. TheJ.P. court noted:
[G]iven its concern for perpetuating the values associated with conven-
tional marriage and the family as the basic unit of society, the state has
a substantial interest in viewing homosexuality as errant sexual behav-
ior which threatens the social fabric, and in endeavoring to protect mi-
nors from being influenced by those who advocate homosexual
lifestyles.
Id at 792 (quoting Roberts v. Roberts, 22 Ohio App. 3d 127, 129, 489 N.E.2d
1067, 1070 (1985)).
63. No. 87-238-I, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 123 (Tenn. App. Mar. 30,
1988).
64. Id. at *7-8. While the Collins majority specifically said that it was not
going to judge the mother by her morals, the court's decision appears to be
based solely on the mother's homosexual lifestyle. Id. at *6-8.
An in-depth analysis of the details of a homosexual parent's sexual activity is
not uncommon in court opinions. See, e.g., id. at *10-16 (Tomlin, P.J., concur-
ring). In contrast, court decisions in custody disputes between heterosexual
couples restrict discussion of the moral standards or conduct of the parents only
to situations where such conduct may adversely affect the child. See, e.g., Kraus v.
Kraus, 10 Ohio App. 3d 63, 460 N.E.2d 680 (1983) (mother's cohabitation with
boyfriend did not indicate need for change in custody). But see Beargie, supra
note 1, at 81-83.
In a 1988 Ohio Court of Appeals decision, the dissenting judge remarked
that "all adult male homosexuals do not pursue a 'gay-lifestyle' anymore [sic]
than all adult male heterosexuals pursue a 'swingers-lifestyle.'" In re the Adop-
tion of Charles B., No. CA-3382, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 4435, at *28 (Ohio
App. Oct. 28, 1988) (Wise, J., dissenting), rev'd, sub nom. In re Adoption of
Charles B., 50 Ohio St. 3d 88, 552 N-.E.2d 884 (1990). Unfortunately, these
stereotypes do exist, and courts continue to cross-examine homosexual parents
about their sexual activity.
65. Collins, No. 87-238-I1, at *9-30 (Tenn. App. March 30, 1988) (LEXIS,
States library, Tenn. file) (Tomlin, P.J., concurring).
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"choosing" it as a lifestyle.66 He also placed great weight on his fear
that homosexuality is a learned behavior, stating that "[y]oung people
form their sexual identity partly on the basis of models they see in soci-
ety. If homosexual behavior is legalized, and thus partly legitimized, an
adolescent may question whether he or she should 'choose' heterosexu-
ality."' 67 This logic, however, directly contradicts psychological studies
which indicate that homosexuality is not a learned behavior.68
Although courts should examine the fitness of each parent to en-
sure that a child is placed in the best environment, homophobic6 9 fears
that the child's sexual identity or social development will be damaged by
a gay or lesbian parent's sexual identity should not control custody deci-
sions. Furthermore, psychological and sociological studies indicate that
the effects these courts fear have not been found in children ex-
amined. 70 Children of homosexual parents exhibit the same psychosex-
ual characteristics as those of heterosexual parents in the areas of sexual
orientation, gender identity and sex role behavior.71 One study has
shown that there is no difference in the type and frequency of emotional
problems between the two groups of children.7 2 In addition, tests re-
66. Id at *15-16 (Tomlin, P.J., concurring).
67. Id. at * 17 (Tomlin, P.J., concurring). This logic was also expressed by a
California court which feared that children may "pick up mannerisms, the be-
havior, and the way of speaking and talking, and gait, and other things that are
likely to be decisive in which way these girls will go with their sexual identifica-
tion at this particular time and over the next few years." See Hitchens, Social
Attitudes, Legal Standards and Personal Trauma in Child Custody Cases, 5 J. HoMosExu-
ALrrv 89, 95 n.2 (1979) (citing Smith v. Smith, Civ. No. 125497 (Superior Court
of California, County of Stanislaus 1978) (Reporter's Transcript, at 38)).
68. See, e.g., Green, supra note 54, at 696 (at least 36 of 37 children raised in
unconventional families had "typical" and "apparently conventional"
psychosexual development); Kleber, Howell & Tibbits-Kleber, supra note 54, at
83 ("no evidence of aberrant gender identity, social development, or sexual ob-ject choice" in lesbian mother families). There is no indication that the Collinsjudge's observations were based on any psychological or sociological evidence.
In fact, a strong argument can be made that children benefit from exposure to
homosexual relationships. See, e.g., M.P. v. S.P., 169 N.J. Super. 425, 438, 404
A.2d 1256, 1263 (App. Div. 1979). In M.P., a New Jersey superior court sug-
gested that placing two girls with their lesbian mother would not necessarily
"jeopardize" their moral development, because it was 'just as reasonable to ex-
pect" that they would become stronger and more self-confident in their develop-
ing moral standards as a result of their living in a homosexual-parent family. Id.
Additionally, teenagers who are questioning their own sexual orientation and
fear that society will disapprove may "closet" their emotions and remain de-
tached. Having positive gay and lesbian role models may help them come to
terms with their own sexuality.
69. "Homophobia" is generally defined as "an irrational fear or intolerance
of homosexuality or homosexual persons." Herek, On Heterosexual Masculinity, 29
AM. BEAV. ScIENIsT 563 (1986).
70. For a discussion of the psychological and sociological data, see supra
note 54 and infra notes 72 & 157-164 and accompanying text.
71. For a discussion of survey results concerning the characteristics of chil-
dren with homosexual parents, see supra note 68.
72. Kirkpatrick, Smith & Roy, Lesbian Mothers and Their Children: A Compara-
1676 [Vol. 36: p. 1665
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veal that there is no evidence of "conversion" of otherwise heterosexual
children into homosexual children. 7 3 The very fact that homosexual
children are the offspring of heterosexual parents verifies that the sexual
orientation of a parent does not control the child's orientation. 74
2. Societal Stigma and Homaphobia
Courts often will look to issues peripheral to morality in determin-
ing whether a gay or lesbian parent is fit to have custody of his or her
child.7" The justification frequently used for this approach is that har-
assment, stigmatization and peer pressure will have a detrimental impact
on the child of a gay or lesbian person.7 6 This justification, however,
tive Study, 51 AM. J. ORTHopsYcHIATRY 545, 551 (1981) (citing other environ-
mental influences, such as marital discord and frequent moves or changes of
child-care arrangement, as having a more significant detrimental impact on the
children than sexual orientation of their parents).
73. See Miller, Gay Fathers and Their Children, 28 FAM. COORDINATOR 544, 547
(1979) (gay father commented: "My straight parents failed to make me straight,
so there's no reason to believe I'd succeed in doing the reverse with (my son]
even if I wanted to."); Comment, Assessing Children's Best Interests When a Parent is
Gay or Lesbian: Toward a Rational Custody Standard, 32 UCLA L. REV. 852, 882
(1985) (idea of "homosexual recruiters" refuted by fact that "every study on the
subject" discovers homosexual orientation "as randomly and in the same pro-
portion" among children of homosexual couples as in general population); see
also Rivera, Legal Issues in Gay and Lesbian Parenting, in GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS
199, 211 (F. Bozett ed. 1987) ("Who are the parents of gay human beings?
Heterosexuals hold that distinction, in the great majority of cases. Obviously,
the way to prevent homosexuality is to prevent heterosexual childbearing or
childrearing.").
In fact, contrary to the argument that a homosexual parent will "convert"
his or her child, many gay and lesbian parents report that they would not want
their children to be homosexual because of social stigma and homophobic ste-
reotypes. See, e.g., J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786, 789 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (gay
father stated he would prefer his daughter to be heterosexual because of soci-
ety's attitude towards homosexuality). Apparently, courts that fear the possibil-
ity that children of homosexual parents will themselves be homosexual are
unaware of the psychological studies performed. Perhaps if the legal community
was exposed to the information obtained in these social science reports, custody
decisions would reflect a more realistic analysis.
74. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1987, § 3, at 1, col. 1. The chairman of the
American Psychological Association's Committee on Lesbian and Gay Concerns
stated: "People who worry that a child's sexual orientation inevitably will follow
that of their parents should remember that most people who are homosexual
were raised by heterosexual parents and surrounded by heterosexual role mod-
els as they were growing up." Id. Furthermore, evidence indicates that gay or
lesbian parents do not have the ability to "convert" their children to lead a ho-
mosexual lifestyle even if this was their goal. See Comment, supra note 73, at 882
("[A]s they grow up, children adopt sexual orientations independently from
their parents.").
75. Cf. Hitchens, supra note 67, at 90 ("[S]ociety's assumptions and
prejudices regarding both homosexuality and the proper way to raise children
are reflected in the laws and court decisions.").
76. See Comment, supra note 73, at 877 n.157 (quoting Steven Lachs, the
first openly gay United States judge, who considers concern over harassment "a
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must not be permitted to bar homosexual custody per se, otherwise the
legal system is condoning the persistence of homophobia. 77
The kind of harassment to which homosexual parents and their chil-
dren are subjected by "queer bashers" and cruel children is similar to
the harassment historically experienced by persons who sought interra-
cial marriages. 78 Initially, courts were reluctant to accept such mar-
riages, viewing interracial relationships as against the best interest of the
children. 79 The United States Supreme Court, however, held that
majoritarian morals could not prevail where they promoted miscegena-
tion laws that were clearly based on prejudice.80
Additionally, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the argu-
ment that fears of societal prejudice and harassment should control cus-
tody decisions.81 In Palmore v. Sidoti,8 2 the Court acknowledged that
there was a possibility the child might be stigmatized because her white
mother had married a black man, but stated that the equal protection
clause of the Constitution would not allow this fact to be the determina-
tive factor in deciding whether to remove the child from her mother's
custody.83 The Court opined that a denial of custody may not be based
on "private biases and the possible injury they might inflict."184 Instead,
the Court found that "[tihe Constitution cannot control such prejudices
but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach
of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect."8 5
While the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the custody rights of homo-
sexual parents, some state courts have applied Palmore-like reasoning in
granting custody to homosexual parents.8 6
truly rational concern, considering the intensity of our society's prejudice and
the cruelty which children can exhibit toward one another").
77. Id. at 878. One commentator has warned:
Each time a court recognizes society's lack of acceptance as a valid rea-
son for anti-gay discrimination, the non-acceptance is perpetuated and
further memorialized in law. The judge is in a unique position to help
to alleviate some of the social stigma of homosexuality .... by allowing
a loving (homosexual) parent to share in the custody of his or her child.
Instead .... judges often feel compelled to invoke society's prejudice as
the justification for hindering that parent-child relationship.
Id. (footnote omitted).
78. See Comment, supra note 1, at 404.
79. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 430-31 (1984).
80. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (Virginia's laws prohibiting
interracial marriage violated equal protection and due process clauses of Consti-
tution, because conduct they proscribed was generally accepted when engaged
in by white couples or black couples).
81. See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433-34.
82. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
83. Id. at 433-34.
84. Id. at 433.
85. Id.
86. See cases cited infra notes 87, 90-92. It should be noted that homosex-
uality is not currently a protected constitutional classification. In Bowers v.
1678 [Vol. 36: p. 1665
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In M.P. v. S.P.,87 a NewJersey appellate court became the first court
to hold that private biases may not affect custody orders, when it refused
to modify an order granting a lesbian mother custody of her children.
The New Jersey court recognized that the social stigma involved would
not be eliminated by changing the custody decree. The court found that
the stigma and potential embarrassment, if they existed at all, were the
result of having a homosexual parent and did not arise from the fact that
the children lived with a lesbian mother.8 8 The court also recognized
that the lesbian mother's continuing custody of her children could have
a beneficial effect, stating:
Of overriding importance is that within the context of a loving
and supportive relationship there is no reason to think that the
girls will be unable to manage whatever anxieties may flow
from the community's disapproval of their mother....
If defendant retains custody, it may be that because the
community is intolerant of her differences these girls may
sometimes have to bear themselves with greater than ordinary
fortitude. But this does not necessarily portend that their
moral welfare or safety will be jeopardized. It is just as reason-
able to expect that they will emerge better equipped to search
out their own standards of right and wrong, better able to per-
ceive that the majority is not always correct in its moral judg-
ments, and better able to understand the importance of
conforming their beliefs to the requirements of reason and
tested knowledge, not the constraints of currently popular sen-
timent or prejudice.89
Since the 1984 Palmore decision, the Supreme Court's reasoning has
been applied to custody cases involving homosexual parents in Alaska,90
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the Supreme Court expressly stated that there is
no fundamental right to engage in homosexual conduct and therefore, such con-
duct is not afforded constitutional protection. Id. at 191-92. For a plausible
argument that homosexuality should be afforded intermediate scrutiny under
the equal protection clause, see Comment, supra note 1, at 397-407 (homosexual
people should be classified as quasi-suspect class because they are target of in-
correct stereotypes, have faced history of discrimination and stigmatization and
are politically powerless minority, and because homosexuality is immutable and
unchangeable characteristic).
87. 169 N.J. Super. 425, 404 A.2d 1256 (App. Div. 1979).
88. Id. at 436, 404 A.2d at 1261-62.
89. Id. at 436-38, 404 A.2d at 1262-63.
90. S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 879 (Alaska 1985) ("It is impermissible
to rely on any real or imagined social stigma attaching to Mother's status as a
lesbian.").
1991] COMMENT 1679
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New York9 ' and Ohio.9 2 If other courts are to take affirmative steps in
countering society's negative views of homosexual parents, they must
use the Palmore logic and set aside societal pressures in order to make
custody by the gay or lesbian parent a more realistic option in custody
battles.
3. Criminalization of Sodomy
Approximately half of the states have statutes which criminalize
sodomy. 98 Not surprisingly, even orientation-neutral sodomy laws,
though rarely enforced at all, are usually enforced only against homo-
sexuals. 94 The existence of these laws has been used to strengthen the
argument that society does not approve of homosexual conduct, and
therefore, does not approve of homosexual people.95 Those jurisdic-
tions that use this argument contend that any parent who participates in
criminal acts is unfit to have custody of his or her child.98
Through its decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,9 7 the Supreme Court
revitalized the use of criminalization of sexual conduct as a means to
deny custody to homosexual men and women.98 In Bowers, the Court
held that a Georgia statute which prohibited consensual sodomy was
91. M.A.B. v. R.B., 134 Misc. 2d 317, 323-24, 331, 510 N.Y.S.2d 960, 963-
64, 969 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (acknowledging son would require strength to contend
with genuine social pressures, court nonetheless granted custody to gay father).
92. Conkel v. Conkel, 31 Ohio App. 3d 169, 173, 509 N.E.2d 983, 987
(1987) (given that children would eventually have to come to terms with father's
homosexuality regardless of custody or visitation rights, stigmatization resulting
from his sexual orientation was inappropriate factor for modification of custody
decree).
93. Sodomy laws generally prohibit "contact between the genitals of one
person and the mouth or anus of another." See Comment, supra note 1, at 419
n.176; see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 286 (West 1988); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3502
(1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1988);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 1986); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 34
(West 1990); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 750.158 (West 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.293 (West 1987); MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 566.090 (Vernon 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 886, 887 (West 1983);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1976); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 21.06 (Vernon 1989).
94. See generally, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
95. See, e.g., id at 196 (Supreme Court recognized probable basis for Geor-
gia sodomy law was societal belief that homosexual sodomy is "immoral and
unacceptable"); Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 344 Pa. Super. 49, 55-57, 496 A.2d 1,
4-5 (1985) (court found homosexual conduct to be included in statutory defini-
tion of "deviate sexual intercourse" and stated that sodomy was a crime and
unprotected outside of marital relationship).
96. See Comment, supra note 1, at 419-20 (noting that presumption of unfit-
ness is inappropriate because not all states have outlawed sodomy, and not all
homosexual parents engage in this behavior).
97. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
98. See Rivera, supra note 73, at 214 ("The... Hardwick decision will lend
great credence to [the argument that homosexual parents are immoral and
should be denied custody], not only in the states that still criminalize adult con-
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constitutional.9 9 Although the statute did not distinguish between ho-
mosexual and heterosexual relationships in prohibiting the conduct, the
Court's ruling dealt only with "whether the federal constitution confers
a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy."' 0 0
The Bowers decision did not mandate the enactment of sodomy stat-
utes in those states which did not previously have them.1 0 ' Addition-
ally, statutes prohibiting sodomy do not outlaw all sexual activity in
which homosexual men and women engage, nor do they outlaw the
existence of homosexual relationships.' 0 2 Most states, however, do not
provide statutory protection for homosexual persons against discrimina-
tion.10 3 Absent such statutory protection, many courts refuse to protect
homosexual persons from discrimination in areas such as employ-
ment10 4 and the military.' 0 5
The jurisdictions that still have sodomy laws effectively legitimize
similar discriminatory treatment of homosexual parents involved in cus-
tody disputes. Until all sodomy laws are repealed, it will be difficult for
sensual sex, but also in others because of the chilling effect of the majority's
words.").
99. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196. The Georgia sodomy statute provided:
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or
submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and
the mouth or anus of another....
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years.
Id. at 188 n.1 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984)).
100. Id at 190.
101. See Rivera, supra note 73, at 200 ("[T]he Hardwick decision does not
technically affect the status of homosexual persons in those states that have
decriminalized sodomy. Those states are not required to recriminalize such be-
havior.... [The decision] simply allows states to retain sodomy laws free from a
constitutional challenge based on federal constitutional privacy doctrines.").
102. See Comment, supra note 1, at 419-20.
103. A number of states, however, have recently included sexual orienta-
tion as a protected classification under discrimination laws. See, e.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-181b(a) (West Supp. 1991) ("A person is guilty of intimidation
based on bigotry or bias if such person maliciously, and with specific intent to
intimidate or harass another person because of such other person's race, reli-
gion, ethnicity or sexual orientation does any of the following ... ."); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609-595(b) (West 1991) ("Whoever intentionally causes damage to
another's physical property without the other person's consent because of the
property owner's actual or perceived race, color, religion, sex, sexual orienta-
tion, disability ... age or national origin" may be imprisoned or fined); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 16.765 (employment) (West 1986), 21.35 (national guard) (West
1986), 36.12 (students at University of Wisconsin) (West Supp. 1990), 38.23
(vocational, technical, and adult education) (West Supp. 1990), and 66.395
(housing) (West 1990).
104. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9th Cir.
1979) (Tide VII of Civil Rights Act does not extend to sexual orientation in
employment discrimination context).
105. See, e.g., Oronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(private homosexual behavior of naval officer valid grounds for dismissal).
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gay and lesbian parents to overcome a presumption that their "lifestyle"
is illegal and thus, necessarily detrimental to their children.
4. AIDS and Misinformation About Health Care Issues
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)'10 has had a cata-
strophic affect on members of the gay community. This incurable dis-
ease has struck a devastating blow to the homosexual male population-
the primary group to contract AIDS in this country.10 7 While the conse-
quences of the disease are tragic, AIDS is not a "gay plague" or a "pun-
ishment from God," nor is every member of the gay community infected
with it. The threat of AIDS, however, is now mentioned with alarming
frequency in cases of child custody,' 08 particularly where the homosex-
ual parent is the father.' 0 9
Misconceptions about AIDS, who it affects and how it is transmit-
ted, have made it more difficult for gay parents to assert visitation and
custody rights. 1 ' 0 In one case, a court imposed restrictions on a gay
106. AIDS is "a condition of acquired immunological deficiency associated
especially with male homosexuality and intravenous drug abuse." Comment,
supra note 10, at 1013 n.35.
107. See L. FRUMKIN &J. LEONARD, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON AIDS 32-33(1987); see also, R. BAYER, PRIvATE ACTs, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES (1979) (discuss-
ing societal consequences of AIDS to gay community and nation at large); D.
TYcKosoN, AIDS BIBLIOGRAPHY SERIES, AIDS 1989, PART 1, at 3 (1990) (report-
ing that in United States and Europe, homosexual men account for 63% of
AIDS cases).
108. I am referring only to cases raising the possibility of the homosexual
parent's contraction of AIDS or expressing fear of exposure of the child to the
HIV virus which causes it. None of the cases to be discussed herein deal with
situations where the gay parent has or had AIDS or was HIV-positive at the time
of the custody battle in question. Such a case would raise genuine health careissues, which should appropriately be considered by the courts in determining
custody rights. This paper will not discuss the position of an HIV-positive par-
ent, but rather will deal with misconceptions about the disease that hinder other
homosexual parents in their attempts to assert custody and visitation rights.
109. See, e.g.,J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786, 789 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (deny-
ing partial custody to father and noting that incidence of AIDS is higher in ho-
mosexual men than rest of populace and that "false negatives" may hide actual
cases of AIDS); cf. Doe v. Roe, 139 Misc. 2d 209, 221, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 726(Sup. Ct. 1988) (court refused to compel blood test for HIV antibody, recogniz-
ing potential for harassment of homosexual parents in other custody cases).
In the recent case of In re Adoption of Charles B., 50 Ohio St. 3d 88, 552
N.E.2d 884 (1990), the dissenting judge felt that a gay man, although he had
tested negative for the HIV virus, was unfit to be the adoptive parent of a child
with leukemia because the child would be at an increased risk of exposure to the
AIDS virus. Id. at 95-96, 552 N.E.2d at 890-91 (Resnick,J., dissenting). Because
the child's immune system was already impaired from the leukemia, exposure to
the HIV virus would "exacerbate" the physical and mental problems associated
with the child's own immune system problems. Id. (Resnick, J., dissenting).
110. Rivera, supra note 73, at 215 ("[Tihe fear in the general population,
the low level of knowledge about AIDS, and the unfortunate connection be-
tween the disease and gay men have created a formidable obstacle for gay wo-
men and men who wish to parent their children."). But see Comment, supra note
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father for fear that, since he refused to be tested for AIDS, he might
transmit the virus to his children. I Although medical evidence, con-
firmed by experts in the health care industry, indicates that the AIDS
virus is not spread by casual contact, this evidence has not lessened the
homophobic and AIDS-phobic attitudes of society that have been rein-
forced in the courtroom.' 12 In fact, lesbian women, who are least sus-
ceptible to the AIDS virus, are also victims of uneducated courts that
rely on the mistaken belief that all homosexual people are equally likely
to carry the AIDS virus.113
Fear of AIDS is only the most recent factor raised by courts at-
tempting to deny custody to homosexual parents. Prior to the appear-
ance of this disease, homosexual people were branded with alarming
psychological labels. Homosexual orientation was viewed as a kind of
mental illness, and courts were reluctant to award custody to someone
who was "imbalanced." 114 By 1977, however, both the American Psy-
chiatric Association and the American Psychological Association had de-
fined homosexuality as being neither a mental disorder nor a mental
1, at 422 ("To date, most cases to change custody or deny visitation solely on
the parent's possible or actual infection with the HIV virus have been
unsuccessful.").
111. See NEWSWEEK, June 30, 1986, at 26 (Chicago court denied overnight
visitation rights to gay father who refused to submit to AIDS test).
112. See L. FRUMKIN &J. LEONARD, supra note 107, at 32-52. AIDS is trans-
mitted through body fluids, usually sexual contact, intravenous injection of
drugs with unsterilized needles, blood transfusions or in utero from mother to
child. Id.
Many courts that have felt compelled to mention the fact that homosexual
men are in the high-risk category for contracting the AIDS virus have never dis-
tinguished between gay men who were in stable, monogamous relationships and
those who were single and participating in the "flamboyant gay lifestyle" of gay
bars and discos. Rather than recognizing the gay or lesbian couple as a stable
family environment, courts would prefer to give custody to a single heterosexual
parent so as to avoid any alleged detrimental effect on the children. See, e.g., J.P.
v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (denying partial custody to homo-
sexual father and his partner in favor of single heterosexual mother); G.A. v.
D.A., 745 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (custody of son awarded to hetero-
sexual father rather than to former wife who was lesbian and lived with her
lover).
113. Lesbian women are not considered a "high risk group" for the virus.
See L. FRUMKIN & J. LEONARD, supra note 107, at 34 ("AIDS is not prevalent
among lesbians as a group."). Some courts, however, group all homosexual
people together and limit visitation and custody rights based on an alleged
health carejustification. See Polikoff, Lesbian Mothers, Lesbian Families: Legal Obsta-
cles, Legal Challenges, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 907, 913 (1986) (justice
of West Virginia Supreme Court expressed belief that AIDS should causejudges
to rethink opinions on fitness of lesbian mothers to have custody); Rivera, supra
note 73, at 215 (court forbade lesbian mother to kiss her children or even have
them in her home because of potential danger from AIDS).
114. See Comment, supra note 3, at 282-83 (long standing prejudices that
homosexuality is a mental illness still cloud judicial evaluation of cases involving
homosexual people).
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illness.' Is
Another irrational fear is that homosexual men and women molest
their children. 1 6 Studies show that most child molestations are com-
mitted by heterosexual men with female victims. 1 17 Nevertheless, the
unfounded fear that homosexual parents will molest their children plays
a large role in custody determinations involving gay and lesbian par-
ents.1 18 For example, in one adoption proceeding, an Arizona trial
court which denied a gay man's petition for pre-adoption certification
closely questioned him about any "unusual urge or... sexual attraction
to younger boys." '" 9 While the Arizona case was an adoption proceed-
ing and the applicant had no parental right to custody, similar fears are
indulged in many custody determinations. 120
C. Conditions Placed on Homosexual Parents Seeking to Obtain or Retain
Custody of Their Children
Courts often impose conditions on gay or lesbian parents as prereq-
uisites to granting them custody of their children.' 2 1 Many of these con-
115. Comment, supra note 73, at 872 & nn.125-27. In 1973, the American
Psychiatric Association decided that "homosexuality per se implies no impair-
ment in judgment, stability, reliability or general social or vocational abilities."
Id. at 872 n.125 (quoting AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, D.S.M. III: Di-
AGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 281-82, 380 (3d ed.
1980)).
116. See Rivera, supra note 73, at 210-11 (allegations that homosexual par-
ent will molest child are "often accepted by courts").
117. See H. CURRY & D. CLIFFORD, A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN AND GAY
COUPLES 129 (4th ed. 1986) (97% of child molestors in America are heterosex-
ual males and 87% of victims are female); Rivera, supra note 73, at 211 (hetero-
sexual men commit 85% of child molestations while homosexual men commit
only 14%).
118. Rivera, supra note 73, at 210-11.
119. According to the dissent of In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action B-
10489, the trial court asked the homosexual petitioner
whether his "relationship with any adoptive child would be essentially
or totally asexual," and further asked, "Do you feel that you have any
unusual urge or any unusual sexual attraction to younger boys? Do you
feel the absence of any urge towards younger boys? Have you ever had
any psychological tests that were intended to assess that relationship
between you and younger boys?"
In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action B-10489, 151 Ariz. 335, 343, 727
P.2d 830, 838 (Ct. App. 1986) (Howard, J., dissenting).
120. See Rivera, supra note 73, at 210-11. Accusations of child molestation
are also directed, though much less frequently, at lesbian parents. Id. at 211.
121. These conditions only appear in jurisdictions where courts believe
that there is potential harm from the fact that the parent is an "active" or "prac-
ticing" homosexual. Although in such courts homosexuality per se does not
exclude custody rights, these conditions are viewed as compromises to protect
the child from alleged adverse effects of the parent's homosexual behavior. See
Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641, 645 (Utah 1980) ("Although a parent's sexuality
in and of itself is not alone a sufficient basis upon which to deny completely a
parent's fundamental right, the manifestation of one's sexuality and resulting
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ditions stem from prejudices and stereotypes regarding the exposure of
the child to elements of the so-called "gay lifestyle," especially in the
context of the single-sex home. 12 2 In the past, courts relied on fear of
exposure of the gay community in order to completely deny custody to
the gay or lesbian parent. 2 3 Recently, "conditional" custody has pro-
vided a more lenient means of compromise.
The most significant condition placed on a gay or lesbian parent's
custody and visitation rights is the forbidding of contact between the
children and the parent's partner.12 4 Despite the argument that signifi-
cant and stable relationships provide an ideal role model for children,
most courts feel that exposure to a homosexual relationship would be
detrimental to a child. 125 As a result, many courts have enjoined the
behavior patterns are relevant to custody .... "). In reality, these conditions are
more often punitive measures to halt the parent's homosexual conduct. Cf. Col-
lins v. Collins, No. 87-238-II, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 123, at *28 (Tenn. App.
March 30, 1988), (Tomlin, PJ., concurring) (one judge suggested that mother
should sacrifice lesbian life style in order to retain custody of her child). For
other cases where courts have imposed conditions on gay or lesbian parents as
prereguisites to granting them custody of their children, see infra notes 122-32.
122. See Rivera, supra note 73, at 212. One commentator has remarked:
Parents who are allowed to keep custody are often ordered not to live
with their life partner or have any overnight visitors. Presumably, the
children would be affected adversely by seeing their parent express af-
fection and love toward a same-sex individual. We are not talking
about limits imposed on open sexual intimacy in front of children such
as those implicitly imposed on even heterosexual couples. Rather, a
gay parent who is allowed custody must in effect live an "ostensibly"
celibate life presumably seeking sexual gratification in clandestine and
furtive ways. Ironically, courts would thus force gay persons to live the
kind of lives for which they are being condemned by society.
Id. (footnote omitted).
123. See, e.g., In rejane B., 85 Misc. 2d 515, 527-28, 380 N.Y.S.2d 848, 860-
61 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (custody transferred from lesbian mother and visitation con-
ditioned on isolation of child from mother's partner and other homosexual indi-
viduals); see also Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 82 (N.D. 1981)
("(B]ecause [the mother] is engaged in a homosexual relationship in the home
in which she resides with the children, and because of the lack of legal recogni-
tion of the status of a homosexual relationship, the best interests of the children
will be better served by placing custody of the children with [their father].").
124. I use the word "partner" to represent a significant person to whom the
parent has chosen to make a stable, monogamous commitment. The word is
meant to be a shortened form of the more cumbersome "life partner," and not
meant to suggest only a "sex partner." I do not use the term "lover" because
this suggests that the relationship is a meretricious one, based solely on sexual
relations. In most cases, partners have decided to establish a home together,
and many live as they would if it were possible for them to marry.
125. See, e.g., In rejane B., 85 Misc. 2d at 525, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 858 ("[T]he
home environment with [the mother's] homosexual partner in residence is not a
proper atmosphere in which to bring uip this child or in the best interest of this
child."); A. v. A., 15 Or. App. 353, 356, 359, 514 P.2d 358, 359, 361 (1973)
(court affirmed grant of custody to father suspected of "homosexual traits and
tendencies," on condition that no man live in family home, so court might "safe-
guard the home environment against possible pernicious influences").
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parent's partner from any contact with the child. 126 Other courts have
-simply prohibited overnight visits with a non-custodial homosexual par-
ent and his or her partner. 127 Some of the more extreme restrictions
involve a court's ordering the homosexual parent not to live with his or
her partner 128 or to end completely any relationship of a homosexual
nature. 129
One particularly troubling aspect of family living considered by
some courts is the parent's attitude regarding involvement in the "gay
community." Those parents that have tried to lessen the impact of their
homosexual lifestyle on their children have been rewarded with cus-
tody,' 30 while those who were more open about their homosexuality
have been denied that same right.' 3 ' These decisions appear to be con-
cerned primarily with punishing or rewarding the parent rather than ap-
126. See, e.g., Pascarella v. Pascarella, 355 Pa. Super. 5, 7, 512 A.2d 715, 716
(1986) (gay father granted partial custody and permitted to "spend time with his
children outside of [their guardians'] residence to engage in reasonable activities
and events with his children so long as it is not in the presence or company of
[his male partner]"); Scarlett v. Scarlett, 257 Pa. Super. 468, 470, 390 A.2d
1331, 1333 (1978) (lesbian mother granted custody on condition that daughter
not be exposed to "improper influences," particularly mother's lesbian partner).
127. In Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-I, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 123
(Tenn. App. Mar. 30, 1988), the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed a trial
judge's grant of custody to a heterosexual father that limited visitation by the
lesbian mother, stating:
[The mother] will be enjoined and restrained during that visitation
from having the child around her lesbian friend on an overnight basis.
They can go on picnics and things like that, but overnight or spending
the night while this child is in the house would continue the relation-
ship that I am trying to get her out of.
Id. at *3, 8-9.
128. See, e.g., Schuster v. Schuster, 90 Wash. 2d 626, 629-30, 585 P.2d 130,
132-33 (1978) (reinstating provision of custody decree that allowed lesbian
mothers to retain custody of their children only on condition that they live sepa-
rate and apart).
129. See, e.g., N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179, 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)
(court analogized between homosexually active mother and drug pusher, habit-
ual criminal or child abuser, and affirmed trial court's grant of custody only on
condition that she terminate relationship with partner).
130. See, e.g., Whitehead v. Black, (Maine Super. Ct., Cumberland County,
June 14, 1976) (full custody granted to lesbian mother because she "intelligently
[sought] to minimize, if not totally eliminate" the impact of her homosexual life-
style on her children), reprinted in digest form in 2 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2593.
131. See, e.g., S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). In
S.E.G., the court restricted visitation rights of a lesbian mother "to prevent ex-
treme exposure" of her life style to her children, stating:
[The mother] has chosen not to make her sexual preference private but
invites acknowledgement and imposes her preference upon her chil-
dren and her community.... We are not forbidding Wife from being a
homosexual, from having a lesbian relationship, or from attending gay
activist or overt homosexual outings. We are restricting her from ex-
posing these elements of her "alternative life style" to her minor
children.
Id. at 167; see also MJ.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966, 967 (Okla. 1982) (fact that
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plying the "best interest of the child" test.
13 2
D. The Better Model-Requiring a Proven "Nexus" Between the Parent's
Sexual Orientation and an Adverse Effect on the Child
The most logical standard adopted by courts is the "nexus" test,
whereby a parent's homosexuality is not a consideration in granting or
denying custody unless there is a proven connection between the par-
ent's homosexuality and a detrimental effect on the children.13 3 This
approach is the most direct application of the traditional "best interest
of the child" standard, because it does not create an inference that a
parent's homosexuality itself has a detrimental impact on the child's up-
bringing.' 3 4 As a result, the parental fitness of each person can be prop-
erly examined to determine which home environment is best, and the
determination can be free from unfounded fears, misconceptions and
prejudices about homosexual parenting.' 3 5
lesbian mother and partner confirmed their relationship with "Gay-la Wedding"
in church contributed to court's denial of custody).
For an interesting discussion of the effects of hiding one's sexual orienta-
tion in order to gain custody of one's children, see Polikoff, supra note 113, at
907-08.
132. Because the trial court's determination of what is in "the best interest
of the child" is based on several factors, including the sexual lifestyle of the
parent, it is easy for a court to cloak its holding in the "best interest of the child"
test, when in reality, the court is punishing the homosexual parent because of
the court's prejudice. See Comment, supra note 7, at 142-43.
133. Requiring a "nexus" is not a recent development of custody law. In
People v. Brown, 49 Mich. App. 358, 212 N.W.2d 55 (1973), a Michigan appeals
court reversed a denial of custody because there was "little, if any .... evidence
to support the finding that the appellants' homosexual relationship rendered
their home unfit for their children." Id. at 365, 212 N.W.2d at 59. Additionally,
in 1980, the SupremeJudicial Court of Massachusetts overturned a lower court's
ruling that a mother's intent to raise her children in a lesbian household ren-
dered her unfit to have custody. See Bezio v. Patenaude, 381 Mass. 563, 410
N.E.2d 1207 (1980). In Bezio, the court required that a mother's lesbianism must
affect her parenting ability in order to justify denying the mother custody of her
children. Id. at 578-79, 410 N.E.2d at 1215-16. Finding no connection between
her sexual orientation and her parenting ability, the court reversed the denial of
custody to the lesbian mother. Id. at 578-80, 410 N.E.2d at 1215-16.
134. See Comment, supra note 1, at 412-13 ("Because the court, under [the
nexus] approach, actually analyzes the evidence regarding the fitness of the par-
ent and the particular needs of the child, rather than bypassing these questions
through presumptions, the best interests of the child can be more consistently
and accurately determined.").
135. See id. at 411-13. Such an approach does not leave all of the traditional
approaches regarding parental fitness by the wayside. As in any custody dispute,
once a homosexual parent's activities are found to be detrimental to the child,
that factor must be considered in applying the "best interest" test. The "nexus"
approach merely avoids any presumption against the gay or lesbian parent and
places both parents on an equal footing. As the SupremeJudicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts stated in Bezio: "The State may not deprive parents of cuwtody of
their children 'simply because their households fail to meet the ideals approved
by the community ... [or] simply because the parents embrace ideologies or
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One of the first cases applying the "nexus" test, Guinan v.
Guinan,'3 6 has led to favorable results for gay and lesbian rights advo-
cates. In Guinan, it was not clear whether the mother had actually en-
gaged in a lesbian relationship, as the father alleged. a3 7 Therefore, the
court was required to examine the impact that any sexual activity by the
mother had on the children.13 8 Because the evidence revealed no ad-
verse reaction arising from the mother's sexuality, and the court found
her to be "a fit, competent and loving parent," she was permitted to
retain custody of her children.' 3 9
The "nexus" test was further refined in the case of Gottlieb v. Got-
tlieb,140 which dealt with conditions placed on a homosexual parent's
custody rights.' 4' In Gottlieb, the lower court had limited the gay father's
visitation rights as follows:
[It is] ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that defendant's visitation
privileges at his home are conditioned on the total exclusion of
his lover or any other homosexuals during such visitation peri-
ods; and... that defendant's visitation privileges not limited to
his home are conditioned upon the total exclusion of his lover
and any other homosexuals from any contact with defendant
and child .... 142
One appellate judge noted that there was "no real purpose" for these
conditions absent punishment of the father for his sexual orientation. 143
Applying the nexus test used in Guinan,1 44 the Gottlieb court removed
these restrictions from the custody order. 4 5
Courts can best effectuate the placement of children in a home envi-
pursue life-styles at odds with the average.' " Bezio, 381 Mass. at 579, 410
N.E.2d at 1216 (citation omitted).
136. 102 A.D.2d 963, 477 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1984).
137. Id. at 964, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 831. Unfounded allegations of homosexu-
ality often appear in custody disputes because of the presumption that they will
result in granting custody to the other parent. The "nexus" test can be used to
ferret out those fabricated claims by restricting the discussion to whether there
is any adverse effect on the children.
138. Id. at 964, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 832 (court noted any sexual activity taking
place in the presence of the children could have adverse effect upon them,
whether parent's partners were homosexual or heterosexual).
139. Id. at 964, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 831-32.
140. 108 A.D.2d 120, 488 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1985).
141. Id. at 120-21, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 180-81.
142. Id. at 122, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 182 (Kupferman, J.P., concurring).
143. Id. (Kupferman, J.P., concurring).
144. For a discussion of Guinan, see supra notes 136-39 and accompanying
text.
145. 108 A.D.2d at 121, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 181. It should be noted, however,
that the court retained another provision which prohibited the child's involve-
ment in homosexual activities or publicity. Id. The dissenting judge recognized
that the retention of this clause preserved the "unpleasant connotation" that a
gay parent would not realize it is inappropriate to expose a small child to sexual
1688 [Vol. 36: p. 1665
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ronment by stressing factors other than the sexual orientation of a par-
ent. For example, in M.A.B. v. R.B. ,146 a twelve-year-old child who had
severe behavioral problems "in and out of school" was placed in the
home of his gay father who lived with his male partner. 147 The New
York Supreme Court upheld the placement because there was no ad-
verse effect on the boy and, in fact, "the boy fared far better with his
father than with his mother."148 The court acknowledged the possibility
that the child might be confronted with social stigma as a result of his
living with a homosexual parent, but found this fact alone could not be
considered an "adverse effect" caused by the father's conduct. 14 9 The
court also found that the boy thrived in school and was subject to more
rigid studying guidelines in the home of his father. °5 0 Because of the
positive influences and guidance received by the child in his father's
home, the court found that the son should permanently reside with his
father. 15 1
Stroman v. Williams 152 provides yet another example of the use of
the "nexus" test. In Stroman, the South Carolina court found that a
mother's involvement in an interracial lesbian relationship was not in
itself a reason to modify a custody order, absent proof of an adverse
affect on her daughter.' 5 3
These decisions would not have been rendered if the homosexual
parent's relationship had been evaluated under one of the previous
tests.15 4 In cases where the children have suffered no adverse effects
from exposure to to their parent's homosexuality, the "nexus" test en-
activities or publicity of any nature, whether homosexual or heterosexual. Id at
123-24, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 183 (Sandier, J., dissenting).
146. 134 Misc. 2d 317, 510 N.Y.S.2d 960 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
147. Id. at 320, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 961.
148. Id. at 320-21, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 962. The court noted:
R.B. is a caring, worthy father. His homosexuality is not flaunted and
has no adverse deleterious effect on his 12-year-old son. In view of
(cited precedents], the court finds that it is impermissible as a matter of
law to decide the question of custody on the basis of the father's sexual
orientation. The guiding consideration must be [the son's] best inter-
est. At this time, (the child's] needs can best be met by his father.
Id at 331, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 969.
149. See id. at 323, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 963-64.
150. See id. at 320-21, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 961-62.
151. Id. at 331, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 969.
152. 291 S.C. 376, 353 S.E.2d 704 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987).
153. Id. at 378-79, 353 S.E.2d at 705-06; see also Note, supra note 13, at 116-
17. The fact that the father maintained a "traditional" nuclear family with his
new wife and daughter did not sway the South Carolina court, because the father
failed to prove that the 11-year-old girl was adversely affected by her mother's
lesbianism. Id This case represents a dramatic departure from previous orders
where custody awards were based on disapproval of homosexuality and fear of
social stigma.
154. See Comment, supra note 1, at 413 ("[T]he presumptions of the gay
parent's unfitness used in both the per se and middle ground approaches ipnore
the need for factual analysis of the parties' capabilities and of the particular
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sures that the real "best interest of the child" is served without needless
inquiry into moral and societal concerns.15 5
Most psychological studies show that the homophobic fears ex-
pressed by courts that do not apply the "nexus" test are unwar-
ranted.' 58 Children of homosexual men and women who have been
studied do not learn their sexual orientation from their parents,' 5 7 nor
do they develop "improper" sex-role behavior.' 58 One study showed
that lesbian mothers were actually more concerned with providing posi-
tive male figures to their children than their heterosexual counter-
parts.15 9 Another study found that fear of harassment and peer
stigmatization affected surprisingly few of the children evaluated.' 6 0
Furthermore, some studies indicate that children may benefit from
being raised in a household where a parent is homosexual. 16 Gay men
needs of the child.... Both approaches inevitably deprive deserving parents of
custody . . ").
155. See id. ("only the nexus approach is substantially related to the govern-
mental objective of protecting the best interests of the child"). For example, the
Ohio Court of Appeals, granting visitation rights to a gay father, stated:
Too long have courts labored under the notion that divorced par-
ents must somehow be perfect in every respect. The law should recog-
nize that parents, married or not, are individual human beings each
with his or her own particular virtues and vices. The children of mar-
ried parents are expected to take their parents as they find them-as
Oliver Cromwell said to his portraitist, "with warts and all."...
[Thus,] whether the issue is custody or visitation, before depriving
the sexually active parent of his crucial and fundamental right of con-
tact with his child, a court must find that the parent's conduct is having,
or is probably having, a harmful effect on the child.
Conkel v. Conkel, 31 Ohio App. 3d 169, 171-73, 509 N.E.2d 983, 985-87 (1987)
(affirming trial court's order granting bisexual father overnight visitation with
his two minor sons).
156. For a discussion of the results of these psychological studies, see supra
notes 54 & 72 and infra notes 157-160 and accompanying text.
157. See Miller, supra note 73, at 547 ("[T]he link between parental sexual
orientation and children's orientation is weak . . . ."); see also Comment, supra
note 7, at 145 & nn.86-90 (citing empirical studies which indicate that parents'
homosexuality has no significant effect on children's sexual identities).
158. See Hoeffer, Children's Acquisition of Sex Role Behavior in Lesbian-Mother
Families, 51 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 536, 542 (1981) (study showed
"[i]rrespective of mother's sexual orientation, both boys and girls preferred toys
traditionally associated with their gender"); Kirkpatrick, Smith & Roy, supra note
72, at 551 (study of children's "play preferences and sexual interest, and behav-
ior exhibited in the playroom revealed no indication of differences in gender
development between children brought up by lesbian mothers and those raised
by unmarried heterosexual mothers").
159. Kirkpatrick, Smith & Roy, supra note 72, at 549.
160. Green, supra note 54, at 695-96 (of the 37 children studied, only one
boy reported being teased because of his parent's sexual orientation).
161. Harris & Turner, supra note 14, at 103 (Studies show that gay fathers
"demonstrate greater nurturance, are less traditional in their overall paternal
attitudes, and assess themselves as significantly more positive in the parental
role.").
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have been found to be more nurturing fathers, with less traditional pa-
ternal attitudes than heterosexual men.' 62 Openly gay fathers have also
been found to use less authoritarian parenting skills and less physical
punishment, and have been found to consciously avoid sexist values in
raising their children.' 63 Another study found that lesbian mothers are
more tolerant and open to sharing personal information with their chil-
dren than single heterosexual mothers.16
In light of these and other studies, courts purporting to use the
"best interest of the child" standard as the basis of their custody deci-
sions have little excuse for using subjective tests of "fitness" rather than
the more rational "nexus" test.165 By examining each situation on a
case-by-case basis, without injecting unfair prejudices, social stereotypes
or unfounded homophobic fears, these courts could more properly de-
termine what is in the child's best interest.
III. ADOPTION
In contrast to the relatively more progressive approaches to custody
arrangements taken where a parent is gay or lesbian, adoption lags be-
hind custody law and remains a difficult option for homosexual people
who wish to raise children.' 6 6 One reason for the difference in the two
areas is the permanent nature of an adoption order.' 67 While courts
may be more willing to grant custody to a natural parent who is gay or
lesbian, because the order can be subsequently modified upon a show-
ing of changed circumstances, courts are reluctant to issue adoption or-
ders because the order is final when issued.' 68 Furthermore, in contrast
to custody proceedings, judges in adoption proceedings have the discre-
162. Id. (citing R. Scallen, An Investigation of Paternal Attitudes and Behavior in
Homosexual and Heterosexual Fathers, 42 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INT'L 3809B
(1982) (doctoral dissertation, California School of Professional Psychology, Los
Angeles, 1981)).
163. Miller, supra note 73, at 551.
164. Harris & Turner, supra note 14, at 103-04 (citing M. Hill, Effects of Con-
scious and Unconscious Factors on Child Rearing Attitudes by Lesbian Mothers, DISSERTA-
TION ABSTRACTS INT'L 1608B (1981) (doctoral dissertation, Adelphi University,
1981)).
165. Therapists are aware that more and more children are being placed in
the homes of their gay or lesbian parents and same-sex partner. See Baptiste,
Psychotherapy with Gay/Lesbian Couples and Their Children in "Step families" A Chal-
lenge for Marriage and Family Therapists, 14J. HoMosxUALitrv 223, 223-24 (1987).
There are many specialists in the field who understand the implications of this
new family structure on a child. For an interesting proposal of how the social
sciences should deal with this new family unit, see id. at 226-37 (offering specific
guidelines for therapists counseling gay step-families).
166. See Comment, supra note 10, at 1025.
167. See, e.g., In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action B-10489, 151
Ariz. 335, 338-40, 727 P.2d 830, 832-35 (Ct. App. 1986) (possibility that gay
man may enter homosexual relationship in future rendered him unacceptable to
adopt because parental rights could not lightly be reversed after final adoption).
168. See id. at 339-40, 727 P.2d at 833-34 ("custody and visitation determi-
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tion to avoid making any decision at all. 169 As in custody proceedings,
the "best interest of the child" standard is commonly used in adoption
proceedings, and it is subject to the same stereotypes and irrational
fears about homosexuality.' 7 0
Adoption law is created by state statutes, and therefore, it varies
among jurisdictions. 17 1 For example, in New Hampshire, the adoption
code expressly prohibits homosexual parents from adopting.' 72 In con-
trast, New York, New Mexico and the District of Columbia expressly
state that sexual orientation may not be used as the sole determinant in
adoption placement proceedings. 7
A Florida statute, which expressly excluded homosexual individuals
from adopting,' 74 was recently held unconstitutional by a Florida trial
court that found that a presumption of unfitness based on homosexual-
nations are subject to modification upon changing conditions, while single-par-
ent adoptions are final").
169. In an adoption proceeding, a judge may decide that a person's adop-
tion application should not be approved, and therefore, the child remains in the
foster care system or adoption agency. See id. at 337-40, 727 P.2d at 832-35.
Such a conservative "decision" avoids dealing with the issue of whether the child
will benefit from placement with a homosexual parent.
170. See Comment, supra note 10, at 1026 & nn.115-17 (citing Florida and
New Hampshire statutes prohibiting adoption by gay and lesbian persons). For
a discussion of the "best interest of the child" standard and how it is subject to
stereotypes and fears about homosexual parents, see supra notes 75-92 and ac-
companying text.
171. See Comment, supra note 10, at 1026-27 (states regulating adoptions
through states or private agencies may incorporate into law policies regarding
homosexual applicants).
172. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4 (1990) (allowing adoption only by an
individual who is "not a homosexual"). The New Hampshire statute expressly
prohibits homosexuals from adopting or being foster parents. See In re Opinion
of theJustices, 129 N.H. 290, 530 A.2d 21 (1987) (describing proposed bill later
enacted into law). When the constitutionality of this statute was challenged
prior to its passage, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire (with then Judge
David Souter agreeing with the majority) recognized that the bill's goal of elimi-
nating "the 'social and psychological complexities' which living in a homosexual
environment could produce in... children [affected by state adoption or foster
care programs]" was a legitimate state purpose. Id. at 296, 530 A.2d at 24. The
court then affirmed the legislature's finding that "the exclusion of homosexuals
... from foster parentage and adoption can be found to be rationally related to
the bill's purpose... to provide appropriate role models for children." Id. at
296, 530 A.2d at 25. The court, however, struck down provisions prohibiting
homosexual involvement in funded day care facilities as unconstitutional. Id. at
296-98, 530 A.2d 25-26.
173. See The Christian Science Monitor, June 21, 1985, (National), at 3. In
1985, six other states had an unwritten policy that a parent's sexual orientation
could not be the sole basis for denying placement for adoption or foster care.
Id. The 1985 survey also revealed that officials in the area of public welfare were
more likely not to discriminate against homosexual people in placing children
with parental applicants. Id.
174. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1991). The Florida statute pro-
vided that "[n]o person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that
person is a homosexual." Id.
[Vol. 36: p. 16651692
28
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 6 [1991], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss6/7
ity violated the substantive and procedural due process rights of gay and
lesbian applicants. 17 5 The Florida court noted:
While the state's interest in protecting the best interests of chil-
dren is admittedly compelling, that interest is not advanced by
this statutory exclusion. Further, the state's interest in advanc-
ing the best interests of adoptive parents is totally frustrated by
excluding an entire class of parents based upon their sexual
orientation. 176
Most state statutes do not expressly address the issue of homosex-
ual parents, but rather leave the decision of what is in the child's best
interest to the judicial forum. 17 7 Consequently, some state courts, like
those in Arizona, have consistently held that gay men may not adopt.17 8
Other courts, like those in California, do not allow a parent's sexual ori-
entation to be the determinative factor in approving or dismissing a pe-
tition for adoption.' 7
9
In re the Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action B-10489,18 0 illustrates
Arizona's policy of rejecting homosexual petitioners for adoption solely
on the basis of their sexual orientation. In that case, the Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the trial court's refusal to certify a bisexual man as accept-
able to adopt, despite the fact that he was not involved in a relationship,
heterosexual or homosexual, at the time he filed the petition. 18 ' The
court noted that the Arizona statute required a consideration of an ap-
plicant's "social history, financial condition, moralfitness, religious back-
ground, physical health, mental health, fingerprint records and any prior
court actions involving children" before a finding of acceptability may
be made.' 8 2 One judge, in his dissent, strongly criticized the majority's
alleged acceptance of "unsupported findings" to hide the fact that the
175. Seebol v. Farie, No. 90-923-CA-18, 17 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1331 (Fla.
Cir. Ct., Monroe County, March 15, 1991).
176. Id. at 1331.
177. See Comment, supra note 10, at 1027.
178. See Comment, supra note 3, at 282 n.32 (because state common law
characterizes homosexuality as wrong behavior, Arizona courts have not permit-
ted gay men to adopt). For an example of an Arizona case that used such no-
tions, see the discussion of In re the Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action B-10489,
infra notes 180-84 and accompanying text. But see ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-105
(1989) (providing for investigation into adoptive parents' "fitness" but with no
express provision regarding homosexuality).
179. See Comment, supra note 10, at 1029 (describing California cases treat-
ing homosexuality as only one factor used in determining child's best interests);
cf. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d 831, 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1991)
(where Uniform Parentage Act was used to find that non-biological lesbian part-
ner had no co-parenting rights to child conceived by artificial insemination de-
spite a fifteen-year relationship with the biological mother and being listed on
the child's birth certificate).
180. 151 Ariz. 335, 727 P.2d 830 (Ct. App. 1986).
181. Id. at 339-40, 727 P.2d at 834-35.
182. Id. at 338, 727 P.2d at 833 (emphasis added).
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applicant's bisexuality was "the sole reason for its ruling."183 The dis-
sentingjudge analyzed and rejected the court's professed concerns that
the father might be involved in gay rights organizations, its doubts that
an appropriate parent-child bond could be created with a bisexual adop-
tive parent, and its fear that the applicant might have an unnatural or
abnormal sexual interest or intent with respect to the child.' 8 4
Courts also frequently view gay or lesbian couples as equally unfit,
if not more so, than single gay men. For example, in In re Adoption of
Charles B.,18-5 the Ohio Court of Appeals overturned an order that
granted a gay man and his partner custody of a seven-year-old boy who
had been diagnosed with acute lymphocytic leukemia.' 8 6 The court re-
moved the child from this environment despite the fact that: 1) the child
wanted to remain with this couple in their home;' 8 7 2) the agency had
not found the "ideal" parents for the child in three years of search-
ing;' 88 3) the child's guardian ad litem pleaded with the court to allow
this temporary placement to become a final adoption;' 8 9 and 4) the
home of the gay couple was found to be stable. 190
The Charles B. court described the concepts of homosexuality and
adoption as "so inherently mutually exclusive and inconsistent, if not
hostile, that the legislature never considered it necessary to enact an ex-
183. Id. at 340, 727 P.2d at 835 (Howard,J, dissenting) (noting that major-
ity clearly had "no intention of ever letting a bisexual adopt a child").
184. Id. at 342-43, 727 P.2d at 837-38 (Howard, J., dissenting).
185. No. CA-3382, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 4435 (Ohio App. Oct. 28,
1988), rev'd, In re Adoption of Charles B., 50 Ohio St. 3d 88, 552 N.E.2d 884
(1990).
186. Id. at *7, 17.
187. Id. at *6.
188. Id. at *12-14. The agency, having constructed a "characteristics pro-
file" of the ideal adoptive family for Charles, sought to approximate as closely as
possible:
1. a two parent family with older siblings, at least one of whom is a
male;
2. a family with a child-centered lifestyle;
3. a couple with definite parenting experience and preferably with
adoption experience;
4. parents with proven ability in dealing with behavior disorder issues;
5. a family that is open to counseling both in the pre-adoptive and
post-adoptive stages; and
6. a family that demonstrates an ability to deal with learning disabili-
ties, speech problems, and medical problems.
Id. at *13.
189. Id. at *20-21 (Wise, J., dissenting). The guardian ad litem testified
that "[Charles] is [in] need of permanency and stability. ... The petitioner has
demonstrated the maturity, commitment and love for the child such as is consis-
tent with a parent, and, I submit the child will substantially benefit from such an
adoption." Id. at *21 (Wise, J., dissenting).
190. See id. at *8 (court acknowledged petitioner and his partner "share[d]
a long-term, stable homosexual relationship").
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press ineligibility provision."191 The court further stated that the gov-
ernment should play no role in "encouraging" homosexuality. 192
Additionally, the court used a modified version of the social stigma test,
finding that it would be "impossible for the child to pass as the natural
child of the adoptive 'family' or to adapt to the community by quietly
blending in free from controversy and stigma."' 93 Although the court
stated that it was evaluating the case in terms of what was best for the
child and not the petitioner, 194 the majority disregarded all of the posi-
tive testimony before it because of their own biases and misconceptions.
Recently, however, the Supreme Court of Ohio declared that the
court of appeals' ruling in Charles B. was incorrect, and therefore, it rein-
stated the trial court's placement of Charles with the petitioner for
adoption.195 In doing so, the court utilized the traditional "best interest
of the child/nexus test" to determine the optimal placement for the
child. 196
The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding that ho-
mosexual couples were not excluded from adopting under Ohio law.' 9 7
The Ohio Supreme Court then looked to the decision of the trial court
and determined that there was no abuse of discretion in its placement of
Charles in the home of a gay male and his partner.' 98 The court found
that the list of qualities for determining "ideal parents" provided an un-
realistic goal in this case.199 Additionally, the court looked at the spe-
cific applicant here and determined that he was "the one consistent and
caring person in the life of Charles B." 200 By reinforcing his credentials
191. Id at *1.
192. Id. This statement implies that the court was punishing the homosex-
uality of the couple, and consequently, lost sight of the "best interests of the
child."
193. Id. at *6. In the Supreme Court of Ohio, Justice Resnick repeated this
same concern for Charles' adaptation to the community when she stated in dis-
sent that Charles had "too many other issues that he has to conquer in his life"
to be a good candidate for a homosexual family setting. In re Adoption of
Charles B., 50 Ohio St. 3d 88, 96, 552 N.E.2d 884, 891 (1990) (Resnick, J.,
dissenting).
194. In re Adoption of Charles B., No. CA-3382, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS
4435, at *17 (Ohio App. Oct. 28, 1988).
195. In re Adoption of Charles B., 50 Ohio St. 3d at 94, 552 N.E.2d at 890.
196. See id. at 90-94, 552 N.E.2d at 886-90.
197. Id. at 90, 552 N.E.2d at 886. In reversing the court of appeals' deter-
mination that homosexual applicants were not eligible to adopt as a matter of
law, the Supreme Court of Ohio relied on the plain language of the state adop-
tion laws, which provided, in relevant part, that "an unmarried adult" is eligible
to adopt in Ohio and "adoption matters must be decided on a case-by-case basis
through the able exercise of discretion by the trial court giving due considera-
tion to all known factors in determining what is in the best interest of the person
to be adopted." Id, (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3107.03(B), 3107.14(C)
(Anderson 1989)).
198. Id. at 93-94, 552 N.E.2d at 889-90.
199. Id. at 91, 552 N.E.2d at 887.
200. Id. at 89, 552 N.E.2d at 885.
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with numerous character witnesses, including his live-in partner, the ho-
mosexual applicant was able to convince the court that it would be in
Charles' best interest to be placed with him.20 1
Hopefully, this landmark case granting a gay couple the right to
adopt a child will be followed in otherjurisdictions. The approach taken
was neither radical nor extreme. Rather, the traditional "best interest of
the child" standard, upon which our legal system purports to base all of
its custody decisions, was applied in its purest sense.
IV. CONCLUSION
As more and more parents are revealing their sexual orientation, it
is necessary to eliminate the antiquated stereotypes, fears, taboos and
misconceptions that permeate custody decisions and adoption proceed-
ings involving gay and lesbian parents. The "nexus test" is not a radical
new approach to a changing world. It is instead a clarification of the
traditional "best interest of the child" standard that has always governed
custody hearings. Socio-psychological evidence reveals that a parent's
homosexuality does not per se adversely affect a child. Therefore, only
when a connection between the parent's conduct and an adverse effect
on his or her child is proven should the parent be denied custody rights.
Considerations of punishment and reward have no place in custody de-
terminations. By applying the "nexus" test to custody and adoption
cases, courts can more accurately judge each situation on a case-by-case
basis and truly determine what is in the "best interest of the child."
David M. Rosenblum
201. Id. at 93-94, 552 N.E.2d at 888-90. The witnesses included two ex-
perts, each with a Ph.D in psychology, the applicant's mother, his sister, his life
partner, the vice-president of a social service agency and the guardian ad litem
for the child. The experts testified to the applicant's close relationship with the
child, his success in integrating the child into his own family and his professional
reputation as a psychological counselor. Id. at 93, 552 N.E.2d at 888-89. The
adoption agency, on the other hand, presented only one witness, a social worker
who never observed the relationship between the child and the petitioner and
testified only that the applicant did not meet the "characteristic profile of pre-
ferred adoptive placement." Id. at 93, 552 N.E.2d at 888.
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